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EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED-THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 793-SECTION 503-A federal district court in Texas has
denied a plaintiff a private cause of action under section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act on the grounds that implying a private cause of
action is contrary to both legislative intent and the purpose of sec-
tion 503, and that it interferes with state regulations.
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
Mildred Lee Rogers, asserting that she was a qualified, handi-
capped individual, brought an action against her former employer,
Frito-Lay, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, under sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,' challenging the termination of her employment.2 Sec-
tion 503 provides that any contract in excess of $2,500 to provide
personal property or nonpersonal services to any federal department
or agency must contain a clause requiring the contracting party to
take affirmative action to employ and promote qualified, handi-
capped individuals.3 Section 504 provides that no person, because
of his handicap, will be denied either participation in, or the bene-
fits of, any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance.4
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as sections 503, 504
respectively].
2. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Plaintiff also alleged
pendent jurisdiction over a claim under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act; however,
since the court held plaintiff did not have a substantive federal claim, there could be no
pendent jurisdiction over a state claim. Id. at 204.
3. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for
the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construc-
tion) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing
persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall
take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals as defined in section 706(6) of this title. The provisions of this section shall
apply to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in
carrying out any contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
4. The statute says: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV
1974).
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Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 5 The court, however, treated defendant's motion as a motion
for a summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice
on the grounds (1) that there is no implied private cause of action
under section 503, and (2) that section 504 was inapplicable since
plaintiff's discovery revealed that defendant had not received any
federal financial assistance since the effective date of section 504.6
To determine the appropriateness of an implied, private cause of
action under section 503, the court applied the four factors which
the Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,7 considered relevant to the issue
of implying a cause of action: (1) whether plaintiff is a member of
the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether
there is any express or implied indication of legislative intent to
allow a private cause of action; (3) whether it is consistent with the
purpose of the statute to imply a private cause of action; and (4)
whether the matter is one traditionally relegated to state law.'
The court held that, even assuming plaintiff was a qualified,
handicapped individual and thereby satisfied the first factor in Cort
(being one of the class for whose benefit section 503 was enacted),
to imply a private cause of action under section 503 would contra-
dict the second, third, and fourth Cort factors. The provision in
section 503(b) for a private administrative remedy,9 when related to
5. If, as defendant asserted, plaintiff did not have a private cause of action under either
§ 793 or § 794, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because neither 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) (1970)-granting jurisdiction for a federal question-nor 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)
(1970)-granting jurisdiction for infringement of a civil right-were applicable. Although 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) grants jurisdiction for any civil action arising under an act of Congress,
it does not create a cause of action. 433 F. Supp. at 204.
6. 433 F. Supp. at 204. Under § 794, federal financial assistance is limited to federal grants
to support activities considered to be in the public interest or for the public welfare. Id.
7. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The plaintiff, a corporate stockholder, sought an injunction and
asserted a derivative claim for damages, maintaining that the court should imply a private
cause of action in favor of stockholders against their respective corporations under 18 U.S.C.
§ 610 (1970), a federal criminal statute prohibiting corporate expenditures in campaigns for
federal office. Thus, the federal statute in Cort was not concerned with any right of the
plaintiff stockholder against defendant corporation but with prohibiting large corporations
from using their wealth to exercise influence over candidates. This situation is distinguishable
from Rogers, where the statute is concerned with the right of the handicapped employee in
relation to the employer. See note 3 supra.
8. See 433 F. Supp. at 202-03.
9. Section 503(b) provides the following remedy:
If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or refuses to comply
with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to employment of
handicapped individuals, such individual may file a complaint with the Department
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the second Cort factor, indicated to the court a legislative intent not
to allow a private cause of action. As support for this interpretation
of legislative intent, the court cited the various defeated attempts,
from 1972 to 1977, to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to give handicapped employees a cause of action."0 Also, in view of
the administrative remedy, to allow a private judicial remedy would
delay and obstruct the enforcement process in this new area of law."I
Next, the court determined that the purpose of section 503 is not to
prohibit employers' discrimination against the handicapped, but to
create improved employment opportunities for the handicapped by
including the affirmative action clause in federal contracts; to imply
a private cause of action, the court thought, would be inconsistent
with the purpose of section 503.1 The court's rationale in determin-
ing the purpose of section 503 was that the handicapped do not
constitute an identifiable, homogenous group, so it is impossible to
compare the treatment received by the handicapped in employment
with that received by the nonhandicapped. Thus the legal term
"discrimination" does not appear in the statute because it is in-
applicable to the handicapped. Whatever different treatment the
handicapped receive from employers stems from sympathetic,
rather than discriminatory, motives. Finally, since the fourth Cort
test cautions interference with state regulation, and a Texas statute
prohibits employers' discrimination against handicapped individu-
of Labor. The Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take
such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms
of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable thereto.
29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
10. 433 F. Supp. at 202.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 203.
13. The Texas statute specifies:
An employer who conducts business in this state may not discriminate in his employ-
ment practices against a handicapped person on the basis of the handicap if the
person's ability to perform the task required by a job is not impaired by the handicap
and the person is otherwise qualified for the job.
TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e (Vernon 1975).
The scope of the Pennsylvania statute includes not only employment but also housing and
public accommodation opportunities. Although this statute, the Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Act, is concerned with various types of discrimination, the 1974 amendment includes
the employment of the handicapped among the goals to be fostered:
(b) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this Commonwealth to foster the
employment of all individuals in accordance with their fullest capacities regardless of
their race, color, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability, use of guide dogs
because of blindness of the user, age, sex, or national origin, and to safeguard their
1977-78
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als," the court considered that such discrimination was a matter to
be left to state regulation.'
The Rogers court, construing these Cort factors to be absolute
rules, 5 structured its opinion upon these criteria in a somewhat
mechanical way and often overlooked their substance.
In applying the second Cort factor, the Rogers court viewed the
legislative failure to amend the Civil Rights Act to include a cause
of action for the handicapped as an expression of legislative intent
not to provide a private cause of action under section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act, thus limiting aggrieved parties to administra-
tive remedies." The court apparently based its decision on the sta-
tutory interpretation principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
Although not explicitly referring to expressio unius, the court
quoted from the enunciation of this principle in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers (the
Amtrak Case)," and thereby summarily dismissed any considera-
tion of legislative intent to provide a private cause of action under
section 503. The Rogers court, however, may have been too quick
to employ this ready-made principle without considering the con-
text in which it was originally applied.
right to obtain and hold employment without such discrimination, to assure equal
opportunities to all individuals and to safeguard their rights at places of public accom-
modation and to secure commercial housing regardless of race, color, religious creed,
ancestry, sex, handicap or disability, use of guide dogs because of blindness of the user
or national origin.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
14. 433 F. Supp. at 203. Thus, the court stated that a federal private cause of action would
duplicate state remedies. Id.
15. Id. at 202 (court refers to "the standards laid down" in Cort). In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975), the Court proposed that these four factors were "relevant"-not totally determi-
native rules or standards as the Rogers court appears to regard them.
16. The court listed the bills proposed to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include
handicapped employees, but which failed. 433 F. Supp. at 202. In light of these defeated
proposals to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and assuming, as did the Rogers court, that
rights of the handicapped constitute an area of law in which traditional concepts of discrimi-
nation are not applicable, the Rehabilitation Act may represent a congressional response to
create an alternative to the Civil Rights Act in this special area of law. If the Rehabilitation
Act is viewed in this context, a private cause of action under this act should be implied since
the act was created to accommodate the problems that the Rogers court considered to be
unique to this area of rights, such as qualification for a particular job. According to this
rationale, since Congress was reluctant to apply title VII to handicapped individuals, it
created the Rehabilitation Act to grant analogous rights in accordance with the special
problems of the handicapped.
17. 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
Recent Decisions
In the Amtrak Case, associations of railroad passengers sought an
injunction to prevent the discontinuance of certain passenger trains
on the grounds that the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 prohib-
ited this. 8 The major issue was whether the court could imply a
private cause of action under section 307(a). This section conferred
jurisdiction on federal courts to grant equitable relief in suits
brought by the Attorney General for violation of the Act, but, in
contrast, granted jurisdiction to hear complaints of individuals only
in labor disputes. 9 The Supreme Court held that a private cause of
action, allowing a suit against the railroads by any aggrieved party,
was not to be implied under section 307(a).10 This decision was
based upon an interpretation of the language of the statute and a
consideration of its legislative history. In construing the language of
section 307(a), the Court noted the specificity used in designating
to whom a cause of action was to be granted: a private cause of
action was explicitly allowed by this section in the case of labor
disputes, while a public cause of action was granted for other
claims.2 The Court considered that such a specific grant of a private
cause of action only in the case of labor disputes was indicative of
legislative intent to preclude a private cause of action for nonlabor
claims. The Court's interpretation was supported by the legislative
history of section 307(a), which revealed that the Secretary of
Transportation, who was to be the primary administrative officer
responsible for the implementation of the Act, opposed the congres-
18. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1970), is popularly
known as the Amtrak Act.
19. As revealed by a reading of § 307(a), the only section of the Amtrak Act that author-
izes any suits, this section purports only to confer jurisdiction rather than to create a cause
of action:
If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any action, practice, or
policy inconsistent with the policies and purposes of this chapter, obstructs or inter-
feres with any activities authorized by this chapter, refuses, fails, or neglects to dis-
charge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or threatens any such viola-
tion, obstruction, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, the district court of the
United States for any district in which the Corporation or other person resides or may
be found shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise prohibited by law, upon petition
of the Attorney General of the United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement,
upon petition of any employee affected thereby, including duly authorized employee
representatives, to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to
prevent or terminate any violation, conduct, or threat.
45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
20. 414 U.S. at 463.
21. Id. at 459.
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sional proposal to permit any aggrieved person to seek enforcement
of section 307(a). 22 Thus, in this very limited context, the Court
applied the principle of expressio unius quoted by the Rogers court
as an absolute principle of law.
The fact that expressio unius was to have limited application in
cases involving the implication of a private cause of action was
indicated by Justice Brennann who wrote the opinion in Cort v. Ash,
which appeared the following year. Brennan, who concurred in the
result and reasoning of the Amtrak Case, pointed to the factors of
specificity of language and legislative history as distinguishing the
application of expressio unius in the Amtrak Case from the circum-
stances in Cort v. Ash. Rather than presume that an existing rem-
edy indicated that no further remedies should be implied (as the
Rogers court did), Brennan's position was that, when a statute has
granted certain rights to certain persons, it is not necessary to prove
the intent to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
denial of a private cause of action would be controlling.24 If Bren-
nan's rationale were applied to the Rogers case, the holding in
Rogers would be reversed. The existence of the administrative rem-
edy specified in section 503(b) would not be sufficient to indicate a
legislative intent not to allow a private cause of action. Since there
is no explicit denial of a private cause of action under § 503, the
plaintiff in Rogers should not have had to prove an intent to create
one. Accordingly, the Rogers court should have implied a private
cause of action under section 503.
In Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hospital," the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached a con-
clusion contrary to that of the Rogers court. Although the legislative
history of section 503 does not refer to a private cause of action, the
Drennon court cited the Report of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, which approved a private cause of action under a
related provision of the Rehabilitation Act, section 504.2 The
Drennon court applied Brennan's reasoning in Cort v. Ash, that it
is not necessary to prove the intention to create a private cause of
action. Since nothing in the legislative history of section 503 negated
22. Id. at 459-60.
23. 422 U.S. at 83.
24. Id.
25. 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
26. Id. at 815. Neither the Rogers opinion nor plaintiff's brief cites Drennon.
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the intent to create a private cause of action, and since a private
cause of action was appropriate under section 504, the Drennon
court granted a private cause of action under section 503.
In its application of the third Cort factor, the Rogers court can
be criticized, on both legal and policy grounds, for its interpretation
of the purpose of section 503. The court's statement that the handi-
capped do not constitute an identifiable and homogenous class of
persons contradicts both the language and the purpose of the Reha-
bilitation Act,2 as well as the Texas statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion in employment of the handicapped. 8 Section 706(6) of the Re-
habilitation Act 29 defines the term "handicapped individual" as
anyone with a physical or mental disability which limits his or her
employment opportunities or other major activities of life. The des-
ignated purpose of the Act is to expand employment opportunities
for these individuals. 0 Thus the language of the Rehabilitation Act
defines a group of individuals who, because of their disability, are
barred from the employment opportunities to which the nonhandi-
capped have access. When the Rogers court acknowledged that the
purpose of section 503 is to improve employment opportunities for
the handicapped,3' yet maintained that the handicapped do not
constitute an identifiable, homogenous group to which the term
"discrimination" is applicable, 32 the court seemed to contradict it-
self. If section 503 is to create employment opportunities for the
"handicapped," then the Rehabilitation Act recognizes that the
handicapped constitute an identifiable group. The fact that individ-
uals, because of a disability, experience limited opportunities for
employment for which they are qualified certainly constitutes dis-
crimination as real as that based on skin color, religion, national
27. See note 3 supra.
28. See note 13 supra.
29. The section defines the term as follows:
The term "handicapped individual" means any individual who (A) has a physical or
mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial
handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to subchap-
ters I and El of this chapter. For the purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter,
such term means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record
of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. IV 1974).
30. See id. § 701.
31. 433 F. Supp. at 202.
32. Id. See also note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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origin, or sex, whether or not the word "discrimination" appears in
section 503.1'
The court's argument fails not only on the basis of language but
also on policy grounds. The purpose of section 503 is to provide
employment opportunities for the handicapped by means of an af-
firmative action clause in some federal contracts. It is somewhat
ironic that the court's comment, that the different treatment ac-
corded the handicapped stems from sympathy rather than discrimi-
nation or intolerance, reflects a paternalistic attitude toward the
handicapped which the Rehabilitation Act strives to eliminate. 4
The handicapped are not seeking sympathy but equality." To as-
33. Section 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. IV 1974) requires the employer to take
"affirmative action" to employ qualified handicapped individuals. The obligation not to
discriminate would seem to be such a basic premise underlying affirmative action that
"discrimination" need not be mentioned. "The obligation to take affirmative action imports
more than the negative obligation not to discriminate." Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogil-
vie, 471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirmed lower court's ruling that the Ogilvie Plan for
recruitment, placement, and training of minorities in certain Illinois counties did not violate
the Civil Rights Act or the fifth or fourteenth amendments).
34. The declared purpose of the Act includes providing vocational rehabilitation so the
handicapped may "prepare for and engage in gainful employment," 29 U.S.C. § 701(1) (Supp.
IV 1974); improving their ability "to live with greater independence and self-sufficiency," id.
§ 701(3); and promoting and expanding employment opportunities for the handicapped, id.
§ 701(8). The White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act also impliedly strived
to eliminate such paternalistic attitudes toward the handicapped as the Rogers court mani-
fests: "[Ilt is essential that recommendations be made to assure that all individuals with
handicaps are able to live their lives independently and with dignity, and that the complete
integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal community living, working, and
service patterns be held as the final objective." Pub. L. No. 93-651, § 301(6), 89 Stat. 2-16
(1974).
35. See C. BRIDGES, JOB PLACEMENT OF THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED 31 (1946) ("Pitfalls
to be avoided are excessive sympathy, 'making a job' for the injured man, and any appear-
ance of charity. The disabled need sympathetic understanding, not sympathy or special
handling.") [hereinafter cited as BRIDGES]. The attitude which would accord a special, and
seemingly benevolent, treatment to the handicapped constitutes a veiled discrimination. See
Siller, Attitudes Toward Disability, CONTEMPORARY VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 72 (1976).
Treatment of the handicapped as a special or separate group constitutes a discrimination
analogous to the "separate and equal" theory attacked in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). Separate or special is not equal either in regard to skin color and its relation to
educational opportunity or to a handicap and its relation to employment opportunity. The
doctrine attacked in Brown has been analogized to the attitudes exhibited toward the handi-
capped:
Thus far we have focused upon the custodializing features of public welfare programs
for the disabled-features which treat them as a minority group permanently apart
and permanently dependent: in other words, as "separate and unequal." To the extent
that these prejudicial premises remain embedded in welfare law and administration,
the legal and constitutional status of the physically handicapped individual resembles
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sume a protective attitude toward a handicapped person and not
hire or promote him to a job for which he is qualified, because he
may hurt himself, constitutes gross discrimination and inequality. ' ,
The handicapped have consistently taught employers, when given
the opportunity, that they can take care of themselves and perform
their jobs as well as anyone. Although the handicapped person may
lack a particular quality, such as sight, a limb, or physical coordina-
tion, he or she often has other assets, abilities, and ways of doing a
job that compensate for the particular disability.37
The court's objection that a private cause of action would delay
and obstruct the enforcement process in this new area of law over-
looks the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,38 which is utilized in cases
involving an administrative remedy. If an administrative agency
has primary jurisdiction, the court will not grant injunctive relief
prior to the agency's decision but will stay the proceedings until the
agency investigates the matter to determine any questions of fact. 9
that of the American Negro prior to the equalitarian civil rights movement activated
by Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.
tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 833 (1966).
But see Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 Emory
L.J. 65 (1977). Wright, who represented the defendant in the Rogers case, shares the view
of the Rogers court: (1) the handicapped do not constitute an identifiable group, so "dis-
crimination" is not an applicable term; and (2) the special sympathetic attitudes toward
the handicapped are not discriminatory. Id. at 67, 93, 100-03.
36. This attitude is analogous to the type of sex discrimination condemned in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Plaintiffs application for a
switchman's position was rejected because under a company policy women would not be
considered for this job which required handling of a 34-lb. fire extinguisher and included
occasional late-hour call-outs. The court, stating that women should be considered according
to their individual qualifications, rejected this attitude of "romantic paternalism" and said
that the individual woman should have the power to decide whether or not to take on
"unromantic tasks." Id. at 236. Likewise, the handicapped individual should be considered
according to his individual qualifications for the particular job and, if qualified, should have
the freedom to assume the risks involved in that job. For further consideration of the concept
that equality is established only if an individual has an opportunity to be considered accord-
ing to his particular talents and capacity, see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff was denied the position of agent-telegrapher because the company
considered the work involved too strenuous for a woman to perform).
37. See BIDGES, supra note 35, at 30.
38. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction involves the issue of whether the court should
withhold exercising its jurisdiction until the administrative agency has determined a particu-
lar question in the proceeding before the court. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §
19.01 (3d ed. 1972).
39. United States v. Fritz Properties, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1950), an action
involving a violation of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, defines the doctrine of "primary"
or "preliminary jurisdiction" as the presupposition of a complete absence of judicial power
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If the court would utilize the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a
private cause of action under section 503 would not interfere with
the administration of justice in this area of law. Thus, the Drennon
court, applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, stayed the pro-
ceedings until plaintiff had exhausted the administrative remedies
specified in section 503(b).10 This approach allows a private cause
of action to be implied; at the same time, it facilitates the efficient
administration of justice by allowing the administrative agency to
perform its investigative work before the claim proceeds through the
courts, thereby relieving the court of this investigative work which
the administrative agency may be better equipped to perform.',
By failing to consider the rationale behind the fourth Cort factor,
which involves interference with state regulations, the Rogers court
misinterpreted the factor. The issue in Cort v. Ash concerned the
implication of a private cause of action under a criminal statute
relating to corporations, a branch of law traditionally governed by
state, as opposed to federal, regulations. In this context, the Court
considered a relevant factor to be whether the private cause of ac-
tion was in an area traditionally relegated to state law42-not, as the
Rogers court interpreted this factor, whether there existed a state
statute concerning the matter.3 Although Texas has a statute pro-
to deal with an issue because of the legislative grant of exclusive jurisdiction to an administra-
tive body. The basis for the rule, according to this case, is "the desire and need for expert
administrative judgment on a technical question"; the purpose is "to prevent a party from
bringing a controversy into court prior to the securing of this administrative judgment on a
question usually involving complex evidentiary material." Id. at 777. Oil Shale Corp. v.
Udall, 235 F. Supp. 606 (D. Colo. 1964), an action against the Secretary of the Interior to set
aside decisions rendered by the Department of the Interior, said that the purpose of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to assure that an agency will not be bypassed on what is
essentially committed to it. Id. at 606-07. In Oil Shale, the court held that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction was not applicable because the issue involved a question of law rather
than a question of fact which the administrative agency could decide. Id. at 607.
40. 428 F. Supp. 809, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
41. See note 39 supra. In Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), an action was brought by the hospitals against the Governor, Commissioner
of Health, Commissioner of Social Services, and Director of Budget of New York for a declara-
tion that a New York statute temporarily freezing rates for in-patient Medicaid recipients,
regardless of the actual cost of the services, was unconstitutional. The court employed the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction to allow the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
to determine the factual question of whether the state plan so departed from the regulations
that it constituted a violation, resulting in the forfeiture of millions of dollars in federal aid
to the state of New York. Id. at 1267. The court cited several other cases involving the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. See id. at 1266.
42. 422 U.S. at 84.
43. 433 F. Supp. at 203.
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hibiting discrimination in employment of the handicapped, the
problem of rights of the handicapped is not one traditionally rele-
gated to state law but has been, like other laws relating to equal
opportunities, an area primarily governed by federal statutes. 4'
Drennon and Rogers present contrary answers to the question of
whether a private cause of action should be implied under section
503.11 Both courts utilized the Cort factors to reach contrary conclu-
sions. However, an understanding of the rationale underlying the
Cort factors, rather than a merely mechanical application of these
factors such as the Rogers court displayed, would have resulted in
an affirmance of a private cause of action under section 503 in
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.
Despite the Rogers court's statement to the contrary," discrimi-
nation by employers against the handicapped can, and'does, exist.
The problem is not, as the Rogers court states, that a person's hand-
icap may affect his productivity and ability to perform a job. 7 As
section 503 specifies,4 8 employers are to to take affirmative action
to hire only those handicapped individuals who are qualified to
perform a particular job. Discrimination occurs when the handi-
capped individual is denied employment merely on the basis of his
handicap without being given the opportunity to demonstrate that
44. In regard to the fourth Cort factor, the Drennon court said: "Courts have previously
recognized the federal government's interest in preventing discrimination, on the basis of
race, color or national origin, in employment in federally assisted activities and programs and,
consequently, have implied a right of a ti on, under Title VI 6f the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d." 428 F. Supp. at 815.
45. Since this note was written, two additional cases have addressed the issue of whether
to imply a private cause of action under § 503. Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp.
1003 (D. Del. 1977), held that the implication of a private cause of action would not be
consistent with the third Cort factor of purpose because § 503 does not make discrimination
against the handicapped illegal in the private sector but requires affirmative action in govern-
ment contracts which exceed $2,500. Contractors should not be exposed to burdens of de novo
litigation but should have their liability limited to the terms of the contract and the applica-
ble laws and regulations. Id. at 1009. Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D.
Ga. 1977), cited Rogers on the application of the second and third Cart factors to § 503: this
section stresses affirmative action, it does not forbid discrimination. The Act and the regula-
tions enumerate when a judicial remedy is appropriate as well as who may seek judicial
enforcement. Referring to this designated remedy, the Moon court, citing the Amtrak Case,
applied expressio unius to hold that a private cause of action should not be implied under §
503. See the discussion on affirmative action and discrimination at note 33 supra for a
contrary view.
46.- 433 F. Supp. at 202.
47. Id. at 202-03.
48. For the text of the statute, see note 3 supra.
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he is qualified to perform the job.49 Statutes prohibiting racial and
sexual discrimination do not mandate that an employer must hire
any member of the minority race or sex but only that qualified
members of these minority groups be given an equal opportunity to
compete with qualified nonminority members for a job. The purpose
of section 503 is to grant qualified handicapped persons an equal
opportunity to be hired by employers who enter into certain types
of contracts with the federal government. 50 To imply a private cause
of action under section 503 would promote this purpose of improving
employment opportunities for qualified handicapped individuals5
without subjecting contractors, who are aware of the affirmative
action clause in their contracts, to any unexpected burdens of litiga-
tion.;"
Sylvia Denys
49. In Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court held that the
Philadelphia public school system's policy of excluding blind instructors from teaching
sighted students violated due process. Although the case was decided on due process grounds
since many of the plaintiff's claims were based on actions prior to December, 1973, the
effective date of the Rehabilitation Act, the court stated that the plaintiff's situation was "the
kind of discrimination which that section [§ 504] was meant to prohibit." Id. at 989. See
also note 36 supra.
50. See note 3 supra.
51. As support for the proposition that allowing a private cause of action promotes em-
ployment opportunities for the class to be benefitted by a particular statute, see the reference
to the recommendation of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, that the 1975 Age
Discrimination Act be amended to permit aggrieved persons to file suit. [19781 97 LAa. REL.
REP. (BNA) 47. The purpose of this Act was to prevent age discrimination in programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. V 1975). The Act is,
therefore, analogous to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination toward
the handicapped in these programs.
52. The Rogers decision was appealed, and the case is currently pending before the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (consolidated with Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 200 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977),
appeal docketed, No. 77-2443 (5th Cir.).
